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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, 
AND PRESERVATION BELOW 
The issues presented by this appeal are as follows: 
1. Issue: Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in 
favor of plaintiffs based on the restrictive covenants. 
Standard of Review: A grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness 
with no deference afforded to the trial court's conclusions of law. When reviewing a 
grant of summary judgment, this Court reviews the record, including all inferences 
arising therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Richards v. 
Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 608 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). On appeal, this Court 
gives a trial court's interpretation of restrictive covenants no particular weight and 
reviews such an interpretation for correctness. Cecala v. Thorley, 764 P.2d 643, 644 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Preservation of Issue in District Court: This issue was preserved in the district 
court in Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Memorandum in Support of Rule 56(f) Affidavit and Memorandum in Support of 
Scheduling Conference and Entry of Attorneys' Planning Meeting Report and Discovery 
Plan filed on August 25, 2003. (R. 99-105.) 
2. Issue: Whether the district court properly denied Appellants' motion 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). 
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Standard of Review: A district court's decision under Rule 56(f) is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994). 
Preservation of Issue in District Court: This issue was preserved in the district 
court in Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Memorandum in Support of Rule 56(f) Affidavit and Memorandum in Support of 
Scheduling Conference and Entry of Attorneys' Planning Meeting Report and Discovery 
Plan filed on August 25,2003. (R. 99-105.) 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The interpretation of the following rules are determinative of this appeal: 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56: 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, 
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any 
time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action 
or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, 
move for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary 
judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) Motion and Proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and 
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(f) When affidavits unavailable. Should it appear from the 
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons 
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, 
the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
This is an appeal from a Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs5 Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Denying Defendants5 Rule 56(f) Motion. (R. 159-68.) 
The Complaint in this action was filed on or about December 26, 2002 seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief based on defendants' alleged violation of restrictive 
covenants requiring that homes in a subdivision in Sandy, Utah be built from certain 
materials. (R. 1-21.) On March 7, 2003, defendants filed an Answer to Complaint 
denying the allegations in the Complaint. (R. 30-34.) 
On July 23, 2003, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting 
memorandum and affidavits. (R. 35-95.) On August 3, 2005, before an attorneys5 
planning meeting report had been conducted and before any discovery had taken place, 
defendants filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Memorandum in Support of Rule 56(f) Affidavit and Memorandum in Support of 
Scheduling Conference and Entry of Attorneys5 Planning Meeting and Discovery Plan 
("Opposition and Rule 56(f) Motion55). (R. 96-134.) In support of their Opposition and 
Rule 56(f) Motion, defendants5 counsel filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit requesting that before 
the court rule on the motion for summary judgment, defendants be allowed time to 
conduct discovery regarding, among other things, non-compliance with the CC&R5s by 
several residents of the Subdivision. (R. 124-27.) Mr. Stephens also requested a 
scheduling conference and the entry of a scheduling order in the case. (R. 124-27.) 
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On November 20, 2003, the district court granted the Motion for Summary 
Judgment and denied defendants5 Rule 56(f) Motion. On February 9, 2004, a Judgment 
was entered against defendants ordering them to remove, within one hundred and eighty 
days (180) of the date of the judgment, the alleged non-conforming material used to 
finish the outside of their home. (R. 192-95.) Defendants subsequently moved the 
district court to alter or amend the judgment which was denied on May 3, 2004. (R. 221.) 
This appeal followed. 
B. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review 
1. Defendants constructed a home and reside at 11787 South History Drive in 
South Jordan Estates, South Jordan, Utah ("Subdivision") (R. 2.) 
2. Plaintiffs are also residents of the Subdivision. (R. 2.) 
3. In or around December 1996, the developer of the Subdivision executed 
and recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office a Declaration of Covenants, 
Conditions and Restrictions of South Jordan Estates, Phase 2 (Amended) ("CC&R's"). 
(R. 3, 10-17.) A true and correct copy of the CC&R's is submitted herewith as Exhibit 1 
to the Addendum. 
4. Article I of the CC&R's provides for the establishment of an Architectural 
Control Committee ("ACC") to approve new construction in the Subdivision. (R. 10.) 




Section 1.2 The Committee's approval or disapproval as required in these 
covenants shall be in writing. The lot owner must submit two sets of formal plans 
and two site plans, (one set for each of the following: South Jordan City and 
Owner), which shall contain foundation plan, floor plans and all elevations 
showing materials to be used in construction, before the review process can 
commence. In the event the Committee or its designated representative fails to 
approve or disapprove within 30 days after plans and specifications have been 
submitted to it, approval would not be required and the related covenants shall be 
deemed to have been complied with. 
Section 1.4 All buildings or sheds must have the approval of the Architectural 
Control Committee and meet all South Jordan City ordinances and codes. 
Section 1.5 Termination of Committee. Upon the first to occur of either (1) 
the completion of the construction of a Residence and the Landscaping upon each 
Lot, or (2) the date which shall be five (5) years from the date of this declaration, 
the Committee shall automatically cease to exist. Any and all rights, duties, and 
responsibilities of the Committee shall at that time automatically become the 
rights, duties, and/or responsibilities of the Lot Owners without the necessity of 
the filing of any amendment to this Declaration or any other action. (R. 11.) 
6. Article II of the CC&R's provides as follows: 
ARTICLE II 
GENERAL RESTRICTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS 
Section 2.1 Land Use and Building Types. No building shall be erected, 
altered, placed or permitted to remain on any Lot other than: (1) one single 
Family dwelling with enclosed, attached garage for at least two cars. (2) One 
other detached building which is architecturally compatible with the residence 
(Emphasis added.) 
7. Article III of the CC&R's states: 
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ARTICLE III 
RESIDENTIAL AREA COVENANTS 
Section 3,1 Guidelines, Part A. 
4. Each dwelling must have a masonry exterior with all brick, or brick 
and stucco, or rock and stucco. All stucco work must include some popout detail 
work on all four sides. 
Section 3,4 City Ordinances. All improvements on a Lot shall be made, 
constructed and maintained and all activities on a Lot shall be undertaken, in 
conformity with all laws and ordinances of the City of South Jordan, Salt Lake 
County, and the State of Utah which may apply, including without limiting the 
generality of the foregoing, all zoning and land use ordinances 
Section 3.6 Nuisances. No . . . large trucks, commercial vehicles, 
construction, or like equipment of any kind or type, shall be stored or parked on 
the road or lot or in the front area of the home of any residential LOT in the 
subdivision except while engaged in transporting to or from a residence in the 
neighborhood. Also, no semi trucks or trailers will be allowed in the subdivision 
at any time, and no curb-side parking of any vehicle will be allowed in the street 
during winter months, overnight or for any period longer than four hours. No 
motor vehicles of any type shall be parked or permitted to remain on the streets or 
on the property unless they are in running condition, properly licensed and being 
regularly used 
Section 3.7 Location of Recreational Vehicles. Boats, trailer, campers 
and motor homes may not be stored in the front yard of any LOT or in the street 
side yard of a corner LOT in excess of 24 hours 
Section 3.10 Landscaping. All front and side yards must be landscaped 
within eighteen (18) months after dwelling is occupied. Rear yards must be 
landscaped within two (2) years of occupation of dwelling 




Section 4.1. Enforcement. Any Owner shall have the right to enforce, by 
any proceeding at law or in equity, all restrictions, conditions, reservations, liens 
and charges now or hereafter imposed by the provisions of this Declaration. 
Failure by any Owner to enforce any covenants or restrictions herein contained 
shall in no event be deemed a waiver of the right to do so thereafter. Litigation 
costs arising from noncompliance of these restrictive covenants will be borne by 
the losing party. 
9. The original ACC established under the CC&R's terminated on December 
4,2001. (R. 11.) 
10. On or about July 31, 2002, defendants submitted a building permit 
application to the Building Department of South Jordan City ("City") to construct their 
home using a material known as Hardi-plank for the exterior or the home. (R. 129.) 
11. Hardi-plank is a masonry material made of cement, ground sand, cellulose 
fiber and select additives. Hardi-plank is not made from vinyl or aluminum and has a 
masonry-like finish. (R. 101.) 
12. After defendants submitted their building permit application to the City, the 
City informed defendants that they were required to add a percentage of brick to the 
exterior of the home. (R. 129.) Defendants complied with the City's request and revised 
the original plans to use some brick on the exterior of their home. (R. 129.) 
13. After some neighbors in the Subdivision complained to defendants about 
the material being used on the exterior of their home, defendants contacted the City and 
inquired as to whether defendants must remove the Hardi-plank material. (R 130.) 
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14. The City informed defendants that they were not required to remove the 
Hardi-plank from the exterior of the home because it is a masonry product that meets the 
City's building material requirements. (R. 130.) 
15. Defendants made several attempts to resolve the complaints of the residents 
in the Subdivision by contacting various individuals to address the issues regarding the 
materials used on the exterior of defendants'home. (R. 131.) Defendants also attempted 
to attend a neighborhood meeting where the issues regarding defendants' home were 
being discussed. (R. 131.) The residents who attended the neighborhood meeting 
refused, however, to allow defendant to participate in the meeting. (R. 131.) 
16. During the neighborhood meeting, the formation of an architectural control 
committee was discussed. (R. 131.) 
17. On or about November 24, 2002, plaintiffs and other members of the 
Subdivision signed a petition requesting that defendants comply with the CC&R's. The 
petition states that "[nJ° other house in the South Jordan Estates has siding and they have 
all complied with this covenant" regarding building material requirements in the 
CC&R's. (R. 77-81.) 
18. Several lots in the Subdivision include structures that do not comply with 
the CC&R's, including an unfinished shed and an unfinished garage. (R. 132.) 
19. One home in the Subdivision is partially finished with the same Hardi-
plank material used on defendants' home. This home also does not have a finished yard 
as required by the CC&R's. (R. 132.) 
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20. One home in the Subdivision had a trailer parked in front of the home for 
over one (1) year in violation of the CC&R's. That home also has an addition that was 
never submitted to or approved by the ACC or any residents in the subdivision. (R. 132.) 
21. On or about December 26, 2002, plaintiffs filed the Complaint in this action 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. (R 1-21.) 
22. On or about March 7, 2003, defendants filed an Answer to Complaint 
denying the allegations in the Complaint. (R. 30-34.) 
23. On or about July 23, 2003, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
and supporting memorandum and affidavits. (R. 35-95.) 
24. On August 25, 2003, defendants filed their Opposition Memorandum and 
Rule 56(f) Motion and supporting affidavits. (R. 96-134.) 
25. The affidavit of R. Brent Stephens submitted in support of defendants' Rule 
56(f) Motion states: 
[Discovery, including necessary affidavits and depositions, have not 
been taken for the reasons stated herein, and . . . the Court should enter a 
scheduling order to permit further affidavits to be obtained, depositions 
to be taken, and necessary discovery undertaken in order to obtain a full 
record and permit these defendants on that full record to further 
controvert the ultimate issues of fact of the validity of the []CC&Rs, the 
issue of waiver, the issue of impossibility of performance, the issue of 
estoppel. 
No attorneys' planning meeting or discovery has been obtained. 
Defendants request thirty (30) days to file requests for production of 
documents and depose the plaintiffs. 
Otherwise, these defendants are prejudiced if the relief sought under 
Rule 56(f), U.R.C.P., is not granted, and such prejudice is caused, in 
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part, by plaintiffs' failure to submit a discovery plan to defendants' 
counsel. (R. 125.) 
26. On or about November 24,2003, the district court entered a Decision and 
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying Defendants' Rule 
56(f) Motion ("Order"). (R. 159-168). The Order states that upon termination of the 
original ACC under the CC&R's: 
Essentially, the ACC became a "committee of the whole" of the Lot 
Owners. Having been put on notice relatively early in the building 
process that there were issues with the proposed exterior of 
Defendants' home, Defendants made no effort to address how 
architectural clearance should be sought from the Lot Owners, to 
whom the review function devolved. The subdivision at issue is 
only comprised of 26 lots. Therefore, a committee of the whole 
could have been organized for purpose[s] of this review issue, 
especially once Defendants were put on notice of the alleged 
problems via direct communication, the neighbors' signed petition 
and the cease and desist order. This Court believes the burden was 
on Defendants to engage in a dialogue with their neighbors around 
resolution of the issues. Defendants declined to do so. Instead, they 
proceeded to complete their home despite the protests of their 
neighbors. (R. 165) (emphasis added). 
27. With respect to defendants' argument regarding ambiguity of the CC&R's, 
the Order states: 
The Court categorically rejects Defendants' claims that the CC&R 
provision dealing with home exteriors is ambiguous. It is difficult to 
fathom more clear and unambiguous language than that which states 
the exterior finish of homes in the subdivision must be all brick, 
brick and stucco or rock and stucco (R. 165.) 
28. Regarding defendants' assertions that other residents in the Subdivision had 
violated the CC&R's the court stated that non-compliance with CC&R's constituting 
abandonment of the CC&R's must be: 
in 
Substantial and general noncompliance with the covenant and the 
violations must be so substantial as to destroy the usefulness of the 
covenants. If the original purpose of the covenant can still be 
accomplished and substantial benefit will continue to inure to 
residents, the covenants will stand, (citations and quotations 
omitted) (R. 165-66.) 
Defendants cite three specific addresses in the subdivision where 
allegedly there are, or may be violations of the CC&Rfs. Only one 
of the alleged violations is arguably related to the issues before the 
Court The Court is unclear as to what, exactly, is meant by 
Defendants' statement. In any event, this is hardly indicative that 
there has been such "substantial and general noncompliance with the 
covenant" requiring all subdivision homes to be built of all-brick, 
brick and stucco or rock and stucco as to establish as a matter of law, 
to a "clear and convincing" standard, that this covenant has been 
abandoned. (R. 167) (emphasis added). 
29. With respect to defendants' Rule 56(f) Motion, the district court ruled: 
The Court has reviewed counsel's Rule 56(f) affidavit and concludes 
that it fails to establish "what facts are within the . . . exclusive 
knowledge of the party moving for summary judgment or what steps 
Defendants have attempted to move the discovery process forward. 
Nothing in counsel's affidavit explains how a continuance would aid 
Defendant's opposition to summary judgment. The Court believes 
discovery is unnecessary on what are, essentially, issues of law—the 
validity of the CC&R's, waiver, and impossibility of performance... 
(R. 168) (emphasis added). 
30. On or about February 18, 2004, the district court entered a Judgment 
against defendants requiring that they remove the Hardi-plank material from their home 
within one hundred eighty (180) days of the entry of the Judgment and entered an award 
of $6,180.02 in attorneys' fees. (R. 193.) On or about June 18, 2004, the court stayed 
enforcement of the judgment pending the outcome of this appeal. (R. 273-75.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Summary judgment is proper only where no material issues of fact exist and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In this case, issues of fact were 
raised by defendants in their opposition to the motion for summary judgment and 
additional issues of fact could have been adduced if defendants had been allowed to 
conduct additional discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f). Specifically, the CC&R's are 
ambiguous as to what type of materials are included in the meaning of the word "stucco." 
Specifically, the CC&R's do not specify whether a material that is made of the same 
compounds as stucco but looks somewhat different from traditional stucco is permitted 
under the CC&R's. 
In addition, the CC&R's are ambiguous in that they do not specify the procedure 
for seeking or obtaining approval for construction in the Subdivision after the termination 
of the original architectural control committee. The trial court, however, failed to address 
these ambiguities and instead impermissibly imposed its own interpretation of the 
CC&R's rather than allowing additional discovery and considering all relevant parol and 
extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning of the restrictive covenants. The district 
court erred in ignoring the ambiguities in the CC&R's and denying defendants the 
opportunity to further address the meaning of the CC&R's through discovery. The 
district court's order should accordingly be reversed. 
In their opposition to the motion for summary judgment, defendants raised several 
issues of fact regarding whether violations of the CC&R's throughout the Subdivision 
constituted abandonment of the restrictive covenants. Defendants also requested 
1? 
additional time to explore through the discovery process the relevant evidence related to 
violations and abandonment of the CC&R's. However, rather than acknowledging the 
existence of such facts and allowing defendants to flesh out in discovery the relevant 
evidence regarding abandonment of the CC&R's, the district court summarily dismissed 
defendants' argument regarding violation and abandonment of the CC&R's. The grant of 
summary judgment was accordingly improper and should be vacated by this Court. 
In granting summary judgment on plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief, the court 
failed to consider facts showing that the balance of harms in granting the injunctive relief 
weighs heavily in favor of defendants. Because defendants will suffer irreparable harm if 
the district court's ruling is allowed to stand and because they did not willfully violate the 
CC&R's, summary judgment was improper and should accordingly be reversed. 
Finally, in denying defendants' Rule 56(f) motion, the district court deprived 
defendants the opportunity to adduce additional evidence that would uncover additional 
material issues of fact precluding summary judgment. If defendants had been allowed to 
conduct additional discovery under Rule 56(f), they could have discovered facts relevant 
to the ambiguous terms of the CC&R's, the type of building material allowed under the 
CC&R's, the intent of the parties regarding seeking and obtaining approval for 
construction in the Subdivision and the relative harms of granting injunctive relief. The 
district court erred in denying defendants' request for additional time to conduct 
discovery and the Order should be reversed and remanded to the trial court with 
instructions that defendants' Rule 56(f) motion be granted. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED THE MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
a. Summary Judgment was Improper Because Material Issues of Fact 
Exist Regarding Ambiguity in the CC&R's 
It is a well-settled rule that summary judgment is improper where an agreement, 
"judging solely from its contents, may be ambiguous." Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen 
Bros. Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986). If an agreement is ambiguous due to 
lack of clarity in its meaning, interpretation of the agreement is subject to parol evidence 
as to the parties' intentions in executing the agreement. Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen 
Bros. Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah. 1986) (citations omitted). Even where 
specific terms of an agreement are not ambiguous, if the character of the agreement is 
ambiguous, summary judgment may not be granted. Id. If an agreement is ambiguous, a 
court may not rely on one construction of disputed terms to support a grant of summary 
judgment. Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ^  29 (Utah 2002). When ambiguity 
in a contract exists, "the intent of the parties is a question of fact to be determined by the 
jury." Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 
(Utah 1990). 
In interpreting restrictive covenants, courts generally enforce unambiguous 
restrictive covenants as written. View Condo. Owners Ass 'n v. MSICO, LLC, 2004 UT 
App 104 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). "However, where restrictive covenants are susceptible to 
two or more reasonable interpretations, the intention of the parties is controlling." Id. 
(citations omitted). Further, where restrictive covenants contain "textual ambiguity," 
14 
they are interpreted according to the same rules of construction as those used to interpret 
contracts. Id. In order to determine the intent of the parties, "the entire context of the 
covenant is to be considered. In construing the words of the covenant, the court is not 
limited to dictionary definitions, but the meaning of [the] words used is governed by the 
intention of the parties, to be determined upon the same rules of evidence as are other 
questions of intention." Id. Regarding the interpretation of words in a contract, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held: 
"When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant 
evidence must be considered. Otherwise, the determination of 
ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it is based solely on the 
extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and 
experience. 
Wardv. Intermountain Farmers Association, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
In this case, the CC&R's require that homes in the Subdivision be finished with 
masonry materials including brick, stucco, rock or some combination thereof. In 
addition, the General Restrictions and Conditions in the CC&R's suggest that the purpose 
of the CC&R's is to ensure architecturally compatible structures in the Subdivision. 
Stucco is uniformly defined as "a material usually made of Portland cement, sand, 
and a small percentage of lime " 1988 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 
1170. The Hardi-plank material used on defendants' home is made of cement, ground 
sand, cellulose fiber and select additives. (R. 101.) Hardi-plank is not made from vinyl 
or aluminum and has a masonry finish like stucco. Thus, Hardi-plank is the same as 
stucco and a question of fact remains as to whether Hardi-plank is stucco under the 
CC&R's. However, because the CC&R's do not expand on the definition of stucco and 
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what type of products constitute stucco, an ambiguity exists regarding the type of 
materials that are allowed under the CC&R's. 
In addition, no evidence was presented in the district court as to the meaning or 
definition of the word stucco. The district court, however, imposed its own interpretation 
and definition of the work stucco and concluded in the Order that "[i]t is difficult to 
fathom more clear and unambiguous language than that which states the exterior finish of 
homes in the subdivision must be all brick, brick and stucco or rock and stucco...." (R. 
165.) As a result of the ambiguities in the CC&R's, it is necessary to consider parol 
evidence to determine the intent of the parties. This evidence, however, could only have 
been adduced by allowing the defendants additional time to conduct discovery pursuant 
to Rule 56(f) —a request that was denied by the district court and is discussed in further 
detail below in Section II. The ambiguities in the CC&R's regarding permissible 
building materials preclude summary judgment and the district court's ruling should 
accordingly be reversed. 
In addition, the CC&R's provide for specific requirements to obtain approval from 
the original ACC established under the CC&R's. However, after termination of the 
ACC, the CC&R's do not specify the process that owners must follow to seek approval 
for construction in the Subdivision or from whom approval should be obtained. Although 
the CC&R's state that the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the ACC shall 
become those of all of the owners in the Subdivision, they do not specify if an owner 
must submit construction plans and receive approval from every owner in the subdivision 
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or if the owners must designate a committee to act as the ACC or if some other process 
should be used - such as comparable approval from the city. 
Instead of acknowledging the ambiguity in the CC&R's regarding the process for 
obtaining approval after termination of the original ACC, the district court simply 
imposed its own interpretation of the contract. In the Order, the court stated: 
Essentially, the ACC became a "committee of the whole" of the Lot 
Owners. Having been put on notice relatively early in the building process 
that there were issues with the proposed exterior of Defendants' home, 
Defendants made no effort to address how architectural clearance should be 
sought from the Lot Owners, to whom the review function devolved. The 
subdivision at issue is only comprised of 26 lots. Therefore, a committee of 
the whole could have been organized for purpose of this review issue, 
especially once Defendants were put on notice of the alleged problems via 
direct communication, the neighbors' signed petition and the cease and 
desist order. This Court believes the burden was on Defendants to engage 
in a dialogue with their neighbors around resolution of the issues. 
Defendants declined to do so. Instead, they proceeded to complete their 
home despite the protests of their neighbors, (emphasis added). 
Although the CC&R's do not specify to whom a request for approval should be 
directed, the district court surmised what "could" have happened under the CC&R's and 
set forth what the court "believes" to be defendants' responsibilities with respect to 
obtaining approval for construction of their home. While the court's beliefs and 
speculation may constitute one possible interpretation of the CC&R's, it is unlikely that 
the parties intended that every owner in the Subdivision give approval for construction. 
Obtaining approval from every resident in the Subdivision would not only be 
burdensome and impractical, it would allow one owner to veto any decision made by the 
other owners. It is more likely that the formation of a committee and some type of voting 
procedure was contemplated for obtaining approval for construction under the CC&R's. 
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In any event, the meaning of the CC&R's is a factual issue which cannot be disposed of 
on summary judgment. In order to determine the actual intent of the parties and the 
meaning of the CC&R's with respect to seeking and obtaining approval for construction 
in the Subdivision, additional discovery should have been allowed pursuant to 
defendants' Rule 56(f) motion. 
Even assuming the district court's interpretation of the CC&R's was correct, its 
factual finding regarding defendants' attempt to resolve the issues with their neighbors is 
not supported by the facts. It is undisputed that Defendants did make several attempts to 
contact the residents in the neighborhood to discuss the problems and attempted, albeit 
unsuccessfully, to attend a neighborhood meeting during which the complaints about 
defendants' home were discussed. Again, compliance by defendants' with the CC&R's 
in seeking approval for construction of their home is yet another issue of fact that should 
be decided by a jury after a trial on the merits. 
Material issues of fact exist here. The judgment should accordingly be set aside 
and this case remanded to the district court for further proceedings. 
b. Summary Judgment was Improper Because Material Issues of Fact 
Exist Regarding Abandonment of the CC&R's 
Restrictive covenants in a Subdivision, although generally enforceable, may 
terminate and be rendered unenforceable where there has been deviation from the 
covenants "as to neutralize the benefit of the covenant." Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT 
16, ffi[ 21-23 (Utah 2000). Restrictive covenants will be deemed abandoned where there 
is clear and convincing evidence of "substantial and general noncompliance." Id. 
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In determining whether a restrictive covenant has been abandoned, courts 
consider the "'number, nature, and severity of the then existing violations], any prior 
acts of enforcement of the restriction, and whether it is still possible to realize to a 
substantial degree the benefits intended through the covenant.9" See Fink v. Miller, 896 
P.2d 649, 653 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). If the number, nature and 
severity of the violations are readily ascertainable and constitute abandonment, the court 
need look no further. Id. However, "if abandonment is still in doubt, courts should then 
consider the other two factors - namely, prior enforcement efforts and possible 
realization of benefits - to resolve the abandonment question." Id.; see also Sandstrom v. 
Larsen, 583 P.2d 971, 976 (Hawaii 1978) (the issue of abandonment is a question of 
fact). 
In this case, defendants raised in the Opposition and Rule 56(f) motion issues 
regarding non-compliance with the CC&R's by other residents in the Subdivision, 
including non-conforming structures in the Subdivision, a trailer that violates the 
CC&R's, an unfinished yard and an addition for which approval was never received. 
Because no discovery in the case had been conducted, the information that defendants 
had regarding these violations, including whether any additional violations existed, the 
exact nature and severity of the violations and whether any prior action had been taken to 
enforce the CC&R's, was minimal. Defendants accordingly requested that the court 
grant defendants, pursuant to Rule 56(f), additional time to conduct discovery regarding 
these violations. 
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If allowed to conduct discovery on violations of the CC&R's within the 
Subdivision, defendants could have learned, for example the amount of Hardi-plank 
material used on another home in the Subdivision and whether approval was sought or 
obtained for use of the material on that home. Defendants could discover whether any 
committee had been formed to review and approve construction after termination of the 
ACC. In addition, there are several provisions of the CC&R's that address the 
permissibility of trailers in the Subdivision and defendants could have learned through 
discovery which provision applied to the trailer parked in front of a home in the 
Subdivision for over one year. 
The district court, rather than allow defendants to conduct discovery regarding 
other violations and related issues pertinent to the issue of abandonment of the CC&R's, 
denied the Rule 56(f) motion and entered judgment stating that additional discovery 
would be of no assistance to defendants. In its Order, however, the court acknowledged 
that it was "unclear" as to defendants' statements regarding other violations of the 
CC&R's and summarily concluded, without support, that the issues raised by defendants 
did not rise to the level of "clear and convincing" evidence necessary to show the 
CC&R's had been abandoned. This was reversible error. Defendants should at least 
have been afforded additional time to conduct written discovery and depositions to gather 
all evidence relevant to the issue of abandonment. 
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c. The District Court Improperly Granted Summary Judgment on 
Plaintiffs Claims for Injunctive Relief 
In determining whether injunctive relief is appropriate to enforce a restrictive 
covenant, courts conduct a "balance of injury" test. Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478, 
480 (Utah 1981) (applying balance of injury test in case where injunctive relief under 
restrictive covenants was at issue). Applying that test, courts may refuse to grant 
injunctive relief where the plaintiffs are "not irreparably harmed by the violation, the 
violation was innocent, defendants' cost of removal would be disproportionate and 
oppressive compared to the benefits plaintiffs would derive from it, and plaintiffs can be 
compensated by damages." Id. (citations omitted). 
In this case, defendants' alleged violation of the CC&R's was not willful. 
Defendants received all necessary approvals and permits from the City. Upon receiving 
complaints from other homeowners in the Subdivision, defendants attempted to contact 
several homeowners to address the problem. In addition, defendants attempted to resolve 
the issue at a neighborhood meeting but plaintiffs refused to allow defendants to 
participate. Finally, defendants contacted the City regarding the use of Hardi-plank and 
were informed that because Hardi-plank is a masonry material, it complies with all 
applicable City building requirements. 
The district court failed to consider the fact that the plaintiffs were not irreparably 
harmed by the defendants' alleged violation. The defendants' home was constructed of 
masonry material that is the same as stucco. The home is a high-quality, aesthetically 
pleasing residence. Plaintiffs made no allegation in the district court that defendants' 
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home in any way reduced the value of their homes. Other than plaintiffs' subjective 
opinion of the Hardi-plank material, plaintiffs did not allege any harm resulting from the 
material used to construct defendants' home. 
Finally, the district court failed to balance the relative harms in granting summary 
judgment on plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief. Rather, the court summarily ordered 
that defendants remove the Hardi-plank siding from their home within 180 days of the 
judgment. The district court did not consider the expense to defendants in removing and 
replacing the Hardi-plank material. 
On balance, the harm to defendants in granting injunctive relief far outweighs the 
harm, if any, suffered by defendants. The district court accordingly erred in granting 
summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS' RULE 
56(f) MOTION 
Utah courts liberally consider rule 56(f) motions unless they are "dilatory or 
lacking merit." Crossland Savs. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994); Salt Lake 
County v. Western Dairymen Cooperative, Inc., 2002 UT 39 TJ 24, 48 P.3d 910 (reversing 
denial of rule 56(f) motion where denial deprived party of discovery on relevant evidence 
that could defeat the motion for summary judgment). If a party submits a legitimate Rule 
56(f) request which is denied by the district court: 
The case must... go back for further proceedings as to this cause of 
action in order to afford [the moving party] an opportunity to 
produce evidence of the fact necessary to support the relief for which 
they ask. It is obvious that this evidence must come largely from the 
[opposing party]. This case illustrates the danger of founding a 
judgment in favor of one party upon his own version of facts within 
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his sole knowledge as set forth in affidavits prepared ex parte. Cross 
examination of the party and a reasonable examination of his records 
by the other party frequently bring forth further facts which place a 
very different light upon the picture. The [moving party] therefore, 
should be given a reasonable opportunity, under proper safeguards, 
to take the depositions and have discovery which they seek 
Strand v. Associated Students of the University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 194 (Utah 1977). 
In considering whether a Rule 56(f) motion is timely, courts consider whether the 
moving party is seeking purely speculative facts, whether the party has appropriately 
responded to discovery requests and whether sufficient time has passed since the 
inception of the lawsuit to conduct discovery. See Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 
764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App 1998). A Rule 56(f) motion is neither meritless or 
dilatory where it "targets core issues that might defeat the pending summary judgment 
motion." Energy Management Services, LLC. v. Shaw, 2005 UT App 90 H 11, 110 P.3d 
158, 162. Further, where a party has been denied an adequate opportunity to conduct 
discovery, a Rule 56(f) motion is not dilatory and should be granted. Id. f^ 12. Utah 
courts have not adopted a bright line as to whether a party has had an adequate 
opportunity to conduct discovery. See Crossland Savings v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243-
44 (Utah 1994). Instead, Utah courts consider the timeliness of a Rule 56(f) motion 
under the individual circumstances of each case. See id. An important objective of Rule 
56(f) is to ensure that a diligent party has been provided adequate opportunity for 
discovery. See Price Dev. Co., 2000 UT 26, U 30, 995 P.2d 1237. 
In this case, no discovery had been conducted at the time the Motion for Summary 
Judgment was granted. The lack of discovery, however, was due to plaintiffs' failure to 
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fulfill their obligation to initiate an attorneys' planning meeting and prepare a scheduling 
order. Without an attorneys' planning meeting report and scheduling report, defendants 
could not, under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26, initiate any discovery. Because the 
burden was on plaintiffs to take the steps necessary for discovery to begin, any delay in 
conducting discovery cannot be attributable to defendants. Defendants diligently 
defended this action and responded appropriately to all motions filed by plaintiffs. 
Defendants requested additional time for discovery in their Rule 56(f) motion and also 
requested a scheduling conference. The district court denied these requests despite the 
fact that discovery, as explained above, would have allowed defendants to uncover 
additional issues of material fact responsive to the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Because the trial court erred in denying defendants' Rule 56(f) motion, the Order should 
be set aside and remanded to the district court with instructions to allow defendants 
additional time to conduct discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f). 
CONCLUSION 
The district court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs 
because material issues of fact exist and/or could have been raised by defendants if given 
the opportunity to conduct additional discovery under Rule 56(f). The factual issues that 
preclude summary judgment, include, but are not limited to, the following: 
1. Whether the meaning of the word "stucco" in the CC&R's includes 
materials that are made from the same compounds as stucco and have the same finish as 
stucco; 
2. Whether the CC&R's contemplated a certain procedure for seeking and 
obtaining approval after termination of the original architectural control committee; 
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3. Whether defendants' actions in seeking approval for construction complied 
with the requirements of the CC&R's; 
4. Whether the CC&R's were abandoned due to tolerated violations of the 
CC&R's by other residents in the Subdivision; 
5. Whether the hardships faced by the defendants in removing the Hardi-plank 
from their home outweighed the harm, if any, to plaintiffs. 
Based on the foregoing, the district court's Order should be reversed and this case 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 21st day of July, 2005. 
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COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS 
OF 
SOUTH JORDAN ESTATES, PHASE 2 (Amended) 
11800 South 3600 West 
South Jordan, Utah 
© 
cn 
2 3 THIS DECLARATION Is made this 4th day of December 1996, by S K Development, 
Lp Inc., hereinafter referred to as "Declarant". 
WHEREAS, Declarant Is die Owner of certain property (herein the "Lots") in South 
Jordan City, Salt Lake County, State oF Utah, more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lots, 201 tlirough 226 South Jordan 
Estates, Phase 2 according to tile official 
plat thereof filed with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder in Salt Lake County, Utah, 
WHEREAS, Declarant intends that the Lots and each of them, together with the Common 
Easement as specified liereln, shall hereafter be subject to the covenants, conditions, and 
restrictions, lescrvations, assessments charges and liens heroin set forth. 
NOW, THEREFORE, Declarant hereby declares, for the purpose of protecting the value 
and durability of the Lots, that all of the Lota shull be held, sold and conveyed subject to the 
following casements, restrictions* and covenants and conditions, which shall run with the Lots, 
and be binding on all parties having any right, title or Interest In the Lots or any pait thereof, 
theli heirs, successors and assigns! and shall Insure to the benefit of each Owner thereof. 
AIITICLE I 
ARCHITECTURAL C0N7K0L 
SECTION 1.1 Tlie Architectural Control Committee shall be composed of Steven 
E, Sinner and Gnye H. Brawer. A majority of the committee may designate a representative to 
act for it, In the event of death or resignation of any member of the committee, tho remaining era 
members of the committee, nor its designated representative shall bo entitled to any compensation *sj 









fiECTIQff \jl The Committee's approval or disapproval as required In tiiese 
covenants shall be in writing. The Lot owner must submit two scis of formal plana and two site 
plans, (one set for each of the following: South Jordan City and Owner), which shall contain 
foundation plan, floor plans and alt elevations showing materials to bo used in construction, 
before th* review process can commence. In tins event the Committee or its designated 
representative fails to approve or disapprove within 30 days after plans and specifications have 
been submitted to it, approval will not be required and the related covenants shall be deemed to 
have been fully complied with. 
SECTION 13 A3! fences must meet South Jordan City codes, No walls and/or 
fences shall be cDrstfucied with a height of more than six (6) feet. No waU and/or fence of any 
height shall be consuucted on any lot until after the height, type, design, materials, and 
approximate location thereof shall have been approved In writing by the Ardiitcctui&I Control 
Committee. The height or elevation of any wall shall be measured from the existing devotions 
of the property at or along the applicable points or lines. Any questions as to such height shall 
be completely determined by the Committee, Walls and/cr fences sliail be constructed as to the 
harmony of external design and location in relation to surrounding structures and topography by 
the Architectural Control Committee 
SECTION 1.4 All buildings or sheds must have the approval of the Architectural 
Control Committee and meet all South Jordan City ordinances and codes, 
SECTION 1.5 Termination of Committee. Upon the first to occur of either (1) 
the completion of the construction of a Residence and the Landscaping upon ench Lot/or (2) the 
date which shall be five (5) years from the date of this declaration, the Committee shnll 
automatically cease to exist Any and all rights, duties and/or responsibilities of the Committee 
shall at that time automatically become the rights, duties and/or responsibilities of the Lot 
Owncra without the necessity of the filing of any amendment io this Decimation or any other 
action. 
ARTICLE II 
GENERAL RESTTOCTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS 
SccUo i^ 2.1 Land Use and Building Types, No building shall be erected, altered, 
placed or permitted to remain on any Lot other than: (1) one dnjlc Fhmtty dwelling with 
enclosed, attached garage for at least iyto cars. (2) One other detached bnHrilnc which \s 
nrchltccfumllv cornp?t|b]e yltit the residence. Any additional detached building must be 
epproved by the Committee, and will only be approved after the Oymcr has demonstrated the 
reasonable need for any addltlcnnl buildings and that the Committees approval of any additional 
building will not create a problem for any other Owner in the "SOUTH JORDAN ESTATES" 
Subdi vision* 
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jSccfion 2J Subdivision uf Lot No Lot may be divided, subdivided or separated into 
smaller parcels unless approved in writing by (1) the Architectural Control Committee and (2) 
by South Jordan City. 
fcction 2.3 The houses to be located on Lots #201,211,212 and 226 shall "front* onto 
13S00 South Street. The curb cuts and driveways shall be from Monument Circle (3460 West 
Street) for the houses located on Lots #201 and 211 and from History Drive (3400 West Street) 
for che houses built on Lots # 212 and 226, respectively, Per South Jordan City. 
ARTICLE HI 
RESIDENTIAL AREA COVENANTS 
Section 3.1 Guidelines, Part A. 
1, No Lot shall be used except for residential purposes. 
2, No building shall exceed two stories In height, 
3, There shall be no more than two dwellings of the some style in a sequence 
throughout the subdlvisioa 
4, Each dwelling must linve a masonry exterior with all brick, or brick and stucco, 
or rock and stucco. All stucco work must Include some popout detail work on 
all four sides, 
5, All construction is to be comprised of new materials, except that used brick 
may be used with the prior written consent of the Architectural Control 
Committee. Any other materials must be approved by the Architectural Control 
Committee, 
Section 3J2 Guidelines, Part B. 
1. Each dwelling must have an attached garage for a minimum of 2 cara or a 
maximum of 3 cars. Each Lot may also have a detached garage with a 
maximum of 3 vehicles; provided that neither encroach upon any easement, 
Z Colors of exterior material shall be approved by the Architectural Control 
Committee, Care should be given that each Residence complement those 
around It, and not detract in design, quality or appearance, All final decisions 
with respect to these enumerated standards and their application to a particular 
proposed srucrum In the Subdivision shall be made by the Architectural 
Control Committee 
SKfcffl.?.T? Dwelling, Quality and She, The requirements below are CMfoaivo of 
open porches, garages, end basements. 
Ramblers: 1600 square feet main level* 
Multi-Level: 1600 square feet minimum. Finished square feet constituting the combination of 
the main level ond upper level, but not including family room, half bath and Hj 
laundry room behind gamge, ' !^j 
Two Stoiy: First and second floor combined to equal not less than 2000 square feet, 3 
CD 
* - 4 
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SecHon 3.4 City Ordinances. AH improvements on a Let shall be made, constructed 
and maintained and all activities on a Let shall be undertaken, in conformity with all laws and 
ordinances of the City of South Jordan, Salt Lake County, and the State of Ulah which may 
apply, including without limiting the generality of the foregoing, all zoning und land use 
ordinances. Any Business operated out of the home, must be in strict compliance with the 
Zoning and Ordinances adopted by die City of South Jordan, and may require a conditional use 
permit to be applied for at the City of South Jordan. 
Sertion 3 5 Easements. Easements for Installation and maintenance of utilities and 
drainage facilities arc reserved as shown on the recorded plat, Within these casements, no 
structure, planting oi other material shall be placed or permitted lo remain which may damage 
or interfere with die installation and maintenance of utilities drainage and irrigation, or which 
may change the direction of the flow of drainage channels In the easements, or which may 
obstruct or relard the flow of water through drainage of irrigation channels in the easements* 
SecHon_3,g Nuisances. No noxious or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any 
Lot, nor shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become an annoyance or nuisance 
to die neighborhood, including excessively loud music poduced by any source. No large trucks, 
commercial vehicles, construction, or like equipment, of any kind or type, shall be stored or 
parked on the road cr lot oi in the front area of the home of any residential LOT in the 
subdivision except while engaged in transporting to or from a residence in the neighborhood. 
Also, no semi trucks or trailers will be allowed In the subdivision at any time, and ho curb-side 
parking of any vehicle will be allowed In die street during winter months, overnight or for any 
period longer than four hours, No motor vehicles of any type shall be parked or permitted to 
remain on the streets or on the property unless they are in running condition, properly licensed 
and being regularly used, {Except antique veldcles stored in a garage,) 
jgecfinn 3.7 Locutlou of ftccreutional Vehicles, Boats> trailers, campers and motor 
homes may not be stored in the front yard of any LOT or In die street side yard of a corner LOT 
In excess of 24 hours, except that a vehicle owned by a guest of the resident may be stored in 
a required front yard or street side yard (on corner lots) far up to 7 consecutive days per calendar 
quarter. A motor home cr travel trailer may be occupied by a guest or guests of the resident for 
up to 7 consecutive days per calendar quarter. 
gcctlnn 3Jt Temporary Structures* No structures of«temporary character, ie« trailer 
basement, tent, shack, bam, cr other outbuilding shall be used on any LOT at any time as a 
residence, either temporarily or permanently. 
ffecHon 3.9 Garbage and Refuse Disposal, No owner shall allow hte or her Lot to 
become so physically encumbered with rubbish, unsightly debris, garbage, equipment, weed 
grosvth, or other things or materials so as to constitute an eyesore 05 reasonably determined by Eg 
die Architectural Control Committee. Within ttn (10) days of receipt of written notification by *^j 
the Architectural Control Committee of such failure, die Owner shall be responsible lo moke die en 






or trash- Garbage or other waste shall not be kept except in sanitary containers. All such 
containers must be kept clean and in good sanitary condition. All such containers shall not be 
stored In the front yard, Each LOT and its abutting street are to be kept free of trash, weeds, and 
other refuse by LOT owner (this includes the city strip). No unsightly material, debrii or other 
objects ore to be stored on any LOT in view of the general public 
gpqtfon 3.10 Landscaping. All from and side voids must be landscaped within eighteen 
(IS) months after dwelling is occupied Rear yards must be landscaped within two (2) years of 
occupation of dwelling. All pink strips must be kept free of weeds and planted fa grass, or gross 
and trees hovuig a root system that is not conducive to sidewalk, curb or buried utilities damage. 
Trees planted In park strips shall be purchased, planted and cared for by homeowners and their 
placement shall be directed by the Anchhectutal Control Committee. Any section or a Lot that 
is used for pasture must be well maintained and not over-grazed by livestock. All LOTS must 
bo kept free of noxious weeds and must maintain a pleasant appearance,, All fence lines must 
also be kept clean of noxious weeds. In regards to tress, no Cottonwood, Elm, Box Elder, 
Russian Olive, or Lombardy poplar trees will be permitted on any LOT, 
SgcHoil_3.il Livestock and Poultry. The only animals, livestock, or poultry raised* 
bred or kept on any LOT will b« thoso permitted by South Jordan City's ordinances. However, 
swine, mink, poultiyp pit bulb or other vicious dogs will not be allowed under any circumstances. 
Commercial raising of animals or pets will not be permitted, except with the specific permission 
of the Committee in writing. The number of animals allowed on each lot is to conform with 
South Jordan City's cidlnancca. LOT owners must control any flies created by their livestock, 
lo the best of their ability. Any manure resulting from livestock must be spread or hauled away. 
Dogs must be kept on tha LOT and are not allowed to run at large. Fences must be well 
maintained to insure containment of all animals. Owners shall be responsible for all damage or 
loss Incurred by other Lot Owners or their invitee caused by animals thoy own. Owners will bo 
responsible for maintaining control over animals they own at nil limes If such animals arc taken 
out of the containment area. The enclosure constituting the containment area must be maintained 
such that the animal cannot escape therefrom. Any such containment areas must be cleaned on 
a regular basis to minimize odors and maintain a clean appearance. In no case may any 
household pet or oilier anlmul kept at or around the Residence be allowed to create a nuisance 
for neighboring Lot owners to noise, or otherwise. 
Section 3,12 Ownership* This section serves to presence ihe rights of ownership by 
making specific regulations tlmt will protect the integrity of the LOTS. Property owners will be 
responsible for tiny end all water retention and run off from irrigation or other water sources 
natural or man made, initiated at or pertaining to their property, tliat could affect or damage other 
property or properties. Owners will not be allowed to remove, restrict* or disassemble any 
drainage or secondaiy Irrigation system put Jn place by declarant unless found to be defective and 
replaced by equal or greater system with approval of South Jordan City. 
Section 3,13 Ccnuucuctnieat of Contraction. Purchaser of any LOT within this 




fee simple title Is conveyed to original purchaser, Said house shall be completed with reasonable 
promptness thereafter. Maximum construction time sliall be one year, unless the time limit is 
extended In writing by the Architectural Control Committee. The Architectural Control 
Committee may waive or postpone these requirements if It deems necessary, for duo cause with 
prior written consent of the Architectural Control Committee* However, if the Architectural 
Control Committee waives for one, it shall not constitute a waiver for any more, Each particular 
case will stand on it own, 
gqctift" 3A4 Signage No builder, homeowner, red estate company, developer or any 
ether company or Individual shall be allowed to display any sign within said subdivision that 
measures larger than 2,304 square incites without the approval of the Architectural Control 
Committer. Any Individual or company shall be limited io only one sign per LOT or hornesite 
without the approval of the Aiclutectural Control Committee, S K Development* Inc and S K 
Properties, Inc. may erect signs upon its own property as S K Development, Inc, and S K 
Properties, Inc, deem necessary for the operation of the subdivision, and for the sale of LOTS 
and/or houses within said subdivision. The Architectural Control Committee may cause all 
unauthorised signs be removed, 
Section 3,15 Governmental Regulations, When a subject is covered both by this 
Declaration and a governmental rule, restriction or ordinance, the more restrictive requirements 
shall be met. 
Section 3,16 Antennas, All television and radio antennas shall be completely erected, 
constructed and placed within the enclosed area of the Residence or garage on the LOT. Satellite 
dishes or other electronic reception devices shall be located and screened so as to not be visible 





Section 4,1 Enforcement* Any Owner shall have the right to enforce, by any 
proceeding at law or in equity, all restrictions, conditions, reservations, liens and charges now 
or hereafter imposed fay the previsions of this Declaration, Failure by any Owner 10 enforce my ^£ 
covenants or restrictions herein contained shall in no event be deemed E waiver of the right to 
do so thereafter. Litigation costs arising from noncompliance of these restrictive covenants will 
be bome by the losing party. 
{Section 4J2 Severability. Invalidation of any one of these covenants or restrictions by 
judgement or court order shall in no way affect any other provision which shall remain In full 
force and effect, 
Si'cllnn 43 Amendment Tlie covenants and restrictions of this Declaration shall run ^^ 
mtix and bind the land, for a term of forty (40) years from the date this Ijeclxnation is recorded, 7 r ^ 
after which time they shall be automatically extended for successive, piriods of ten (10) years. 
This Declaration may be amended or terminated by a vote of at least seventy-five percent (75%) 
of the total votes of all owners, which vote shall be taken at a duly called meeting. Any 
amendment approval shall be reduced to writing, signed, and recorded against the LOTS. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being the Declarant herein, has hereunto set Us hand 
tliis 4th day of December, 1996, 
DECLARANT. 
S K DEVELOPMENT, INC 
By t AM^>^T^^<— ^ j ^ ^ ^ ^ - ^ 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE j 
On this 4th day of December, 199tf, before me a Ncusy Public for the State of Utah, personally 
appeared Steven £ Sinner Prudent of 5 K Development, Inc. who executed the w 2 
nstrumcnt and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. IN WITNESS WHEREOF J 
have hereunto set my hand mid affiled my Notary Seal the day and year first above written.' 
CAtf HIO&WO&OWS) 
frcistfUlch Noiar/ for the State of Utah 
ttgff R«ldliw *: West Jordan, UTAH 
TT _^ _ _ vvm\
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